THE SUFFERER AS MODEL IN PHOTOJOURNALISM: notes on the limit of identity

ANGIE BIONDI
Federal University of Minas Gerais

ABSTRACT

Suffering has been caused by press photographs ever since the start of Modern times. Sufferers in galleries exhibit the marks of their misfortunes as a legitimate record of wars, attempts, diseases. Anchored on an acute indicial character, such images also constitute and intensify a complex field of visibility in which disputes and access or placement pacts come into action. The purpose of this text is to discuss the means for turning suffering into a classification in which it associates the sufferer with a condition of belonging. Thus, tied to an identity, body and expression would serve solely the conformation of an ethos, as an exemplary model of personage. In order to describe these strategies, we seek to reflect on affective experiences in this universe of images from the perspective of a possible encounter with what is singular, with any one subject, which is brought about by image.

Key words: Model. Suffering. Photojournalism. Singularity. Politics of Visibility.

"To make all the repetitions co-inhabit a space where difference is distributed" (Gilles Deleuze)

INTRODUCTION

Photographs in the mainstream media take on an important role in the modes of perceiving the reality of life and the everyday world. However, it has been long since their task is not restricted to the mere recording of facts, but instead it configures a complex field of visibility where disputes, access pacts and placement charts between bodies and discourses come into action. Image, in different degrees, rules as a mediator between us and the Other, as well as acting as a center of tension among the manifold systems of social representation, presenting inscribed dimensions, room for negotiation of attributed (or denied) beliefs and values. Finally, image participates in practices of attention, here designated by the figures of suffering.

On a daily basis, photojournalism provides images of victims
of catastrophes, wars, diseases. They are thematic galleries of suffering, almost always featuring ordinary people who have their lives and bodies exposed, who are victims of the events of their ordinary reality, usually stigmatized for their unfortunate, miserable or marginal condition, in the most diverse situations in which they live as outcasts. Displaying a certain physiognomy, certain physical characteristics, imbued by biographic investment, inserted in a specific ambience or related to material elements that shape an identity, the sufferers acquire a condition of belonging.

Nevertheless, while photojournalism attributes to the sufferer a condition linked with his/her class, gender, sexuality or ethnic identity, it also provides a moral content which qualifies and justifies him/her in a given situation. When the figure of the sufferer takes on an institutionalizing role, the object of a transition between tasks of denunciation, protest or acknowledgement, it is simultaneously invested in a position, a specific place given by the genre, which is pervaded by streams of force coming from the power relationships that define places and their occupation by image and spectator at the same time, where the conditions of otherness become defined. It is in this context that we question the role of the sufferer as a model in photojournalism.

If media visibility constitutes nowadays a kind of arena for political disputes focused on identities, beyond the fulfillment of a project of series identification, our interest lies in investigating other possible means for dealing with image and with the Other in images, in a way that the figure of the sufferer may be able to escape from the exclusive condition of belonging, surpassing the determination to see in the particular an absolute, generalizing whole, and at the same time constituting, with the spectator, relational forms that may overcome the acknowledgement regimes imposed by the traps of media representation systems, forms that take into consideration the displacement from this purpose in order to call attention to their encounter.

What is most at stake is not a matter of the capture or intelligible comprehension of such people as personages, but rather the importance of an encounter with this Other which involves us through image, in image; subject and susceptible to experience, the density of which is not condensed into an identity or given by the individuality of a particular subject (or group), but instead an encounter on the level of affection, through the capability of affecting and being affected, the core of all ethical potency according to the Spinozian inflection by Deleuze and Guattari (1997, 42).

However, we view this from a perspective that does not take
singularity as a kind of pure category\textsuperscript{2} as indicated by Agamben (1993); instead, the perspective adopted here sees singularity as pervading identities, or better still, it is a perspective in which the singular comes closer to the common; singularity is seen as a figure of the same order as a “transversal construction which traverses identities, but does not eliminate them” (LOPES, 2010, p. 2) as a whole. Therefore, it is imbedded in the systems of self-description, in its manifold faces, through which affection circles and transforms itself at the heart of its own machinal agency (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997, p. 43). Thus, the relationships established between matter and bodies are not restricted to the reduced schemes of representation, but also, infused with affection, seek a possible opening, a crack, a fissure or displacement.

If identity refers to an acknowledgement process, if it is based on the indication of reference frames, singularity is based on the complex arrangement of diverse forms of the Being in its multiple, broader relationships. That is, singularity involves the understanding of this Being´s constitution, as well as the structures that surround it, but it does not constitute a characteristic of the latter. “Singularity is an existential concept; identity, in turn, is a reference-making concept, a concept for circumscribing reality with reference frames, frames which may be imaginary” (GUATTARI; ROLNIK, 1986, p. 68). Thus, what is reductive of identity is that its basis works in accordance with a system that mixes, into only one same reference frame, the singularity of different modes of existence. Identity turns reference into an essential property of the Being, attributing to it the sense of belonging to a class.

The attempt to understand suffering, in this case, through images provided by photojournalism finds its neuralgic spot precisely in this identifying inscription. If suffering reaches us always in the form of a model, is the access to it condensed entirely on identity? If so, how can one overcome the masks? How can one free it from the demands of sameness and take on a contingent encounter with the Other? Is it possible for a type of visibility system like photojournalism to deal with the Other´s suffering in its singularity?

A dual observation, therefore, involves the situations of suffering from daily life which are presented as figures of experience among the people/personages from the world of life, and the forms in which these very images are offered as mediated experience. Our point here is to question both the position in which the sufferer in the role of a model is placed, as well as the overly limited task which the genre just seems to request for a complex relationship, that of the encounter of image and spectator.
To see on suffering a face: modern echoes

Ever since the Modernism project, which hosted in its interior the many nuances of documental photography work along with the forces that sparked the questioning of the ruling political process, photojournalism seems to be invested with the moral duty of presenting – exhibiting – suffering. It is curious to observe that the exposure of suffering in this fashion is strengthened by the effective production and distribution of the photograph as a document of social denunciation, from the early 19th through the 20th century (SOUSA, 2004; FREUND, 2004). In this same period Welfare State policies drew attention to poverty, economic inequality marked by successive crises, with the “Welfare State” being the regulatory agent of all social, political and economical life in the polis.

The exhibition of the suffering of the poorer classes in miserable situations, of the diseases and plagues that ravaged populations, of violence in wars, of the conditions of an empowered mass of industrial workers - all these became items on the agenda of discussions in modern public places. Suffering was made visible and presented to an undistinguished audience. However, if the project of modern photography itself seemed to invent realities, along its path the sufferers were identified on behalf of a knowledgeable discourse on the social body which needed to be recognized, located, identified, classified, sorted.

The figures of the diseased, of the insane, of homosexuals and of women had to be available in the eyes of the State and of bureaucratic or disciplinary institutions that relied on the development of science (FOUCAULT, 1987). This form of gazing at the other’s suffering participated as an element of pedagogic discourse about the Other. In this context, Hannah Arendt questioned the exploitation of suffering and developed the conceptual basis for a type of politics intended to comprehend and reach the Other. The formulation of the “politics of pity” (ARENDT, 2001) fulfilled two criteria postulated by the philosopher as indispensable for ethical emergence and development of modern political action: visible generalization and collective responsibility.

Based on the criticism of compassion proposed by Rousseau, one that lasted through modern rationality, Arendt indicated that the functioning of pity relied on the necessary distance between the one who suffers and the one who does not suffer as its rational argument. If compassion, as stated by Rousseau, meant a close relationship that led to suffering along with the Other, sympathy for the Other’s pain, but a relationship that was not able to surpass the personal or particular
level, Arendt regarded pity as a logical category, one able to indicate collective responsibility for the Other’s suffering as a universal value. It is pity, according to Arendt, that places the acknowledgement of human finitude as an essential characteristic of relationships and therefore defines political demands.

Thus, looking from a distance at the Other’s suffering signifies, for the one who does not suffer, the experience of recognizing, in the Other’s suffering, human finitude, a concept that merges the relationship between the general and the particular, the individual and the collective. The distance and the positions were necessary, since they maintained their basic characteristics for the relationship between the general and the particular. But the basic requirement of this act of looking, according to the arendtian concept, was to view the spectator as a subject who is implied and concerned about his citizenship role, an indissociably human and political role. This form of looking at the Other’s suffering was revealing for he who understands the “invisible” but direct relationships that involve suffering based on the means of social production and organization. The kind of knowledge generated by this way of seeing the Other’s suffering is that of human finitude as an experience that brings together the general and the particular.

One possible risk is that this line of thought, if misunderstood, might lead to the generalization of suffering based on types of sufferers in accordance with types of socially committed faults. Another risk is the failure to acknowledge and set out the differences inherent to the positions in which the one who sees and the one who is seen belong. Thus, both the responsibility for suffering and the possibility of eliminating it were part of a collective task, according to the politics of pity. To exhibit suffering was a kind of justified denunciation. There was a kind of community united by solidarity as a political project, one that subsumed the adoption of identity devices.

However, this viewpoint considered the presentation of sufferers always in the position of victims, the position of an example or a case to be observed at distance. It was necessary for suffering to be associated with an individual and to present a particular model in order to guarantee the association with general human character. It was an efficient strategy, according to the politics of pity, but one that appeared to be somewhat improper in regard to the sufferer himself, who did not actively participate on any process, who was not allowed to speak for himself, but who became a generic image of a class or group along with so many other sufferers in a gallery. The act of looking, in
In this case, established a knowledge matrix, a field of knowledge about the Other, and at the same time turned the Other into an individual. The necessary distance between the one who sees and the one who is seen also indicated a map of positions, a map for subjects in an asymmetric relationship of acknowledgement and of instituted knowledge.

**Beyond the narratives, singularity**

In contemporary times, press photographs still indicate the ways in which models of suffering share a certain concept in the public sphere. If, on the one hand, photographs do not present situations experienced by a class or social group only as a form of denunciation (ever so present in the modern documental photography project), on the other hand, they still reveal certain manners of appropriating the Other’s experience of suffering and pain. Their function seems not to merely bear witness of daily facts, of tragic situations, but also to comprise the action of describing the perception of the world “out there”, to propose means for accessing this world, to tell about the relationships involving the represented Other, and lastly to offer modes of experience.

Anchored on its acute indicative character, photojournalism functions as a documental instance that mobilizes the production of its images seeking to institute pacts of belief, affection and cumplicity with the spectator through thematic treatment of the ones represented. It is with the aid of these images that certain notions of justice, injustice, fear, indignation, pity, pass through the imagination and help to establish social, cultural and ethical relationships. However, the dispute for the control of visible identities is also the dispute for the legitimacy of discourses that both exhibit and stigmatize, both reveal and benefit inequality. Thus, the model turned into a category wanders through this subtle zone (and this always constitutes an insidious task) from the particular case to the general, from the individual to the group, always as a form of containing, identifying, classifying.

The representation of the sufferer is always displayed as a delimited element and many times is reduced to a figure, associated with the atavistic nature of an identity. Who is this person who suffers? This seems to be the only question, ever more immediate and necessary, made (and also asked in urgent fashion) by the news media. Above all, tragic happenings have revealed the necessity of ascribing to them a biography hastily traced by the media. Who was involved, how did he/they live, where did he/they live, with which habits, with which dreams... In this way, the face becomes the place of political struggle for truth; its
features are composed and delimited by its predicates, for it sustains an identity (AGAMBEN, 2002, p. 107). By this time, sufferer and suffering are taken as a model. Described by the sameness of a classification, the sufferer is almost always the poor, the unfortunate, the miserable, the insane, the diseased, or the deviant. “What is typical is destitute of immanence, the story that it tells makes subjectivity something merely determined by the forces that acted on the subject and reduced it to the level that it now displays” (GUIMARÃES, 2001, p. 12).

However, says Agamben, the nature of a face is simultaneous with the many faces that constitute it. “The human face reproduces in its very structure the duality between what belongs to it and what does not, between communication and communicability, between the power and the act that constitutes it. It is formed by a passive background in which active expression traits are highlighted.” (AGAMBEN, 2002, p. 110). In this way, in spite of this overly mapped position of a face for an identity, especially when its models are disseminated by the mainstream press, the perspective shown by Agamben allows us to glimpse variations according to the use that is made of it. If we understand that in photojournalism or even in other media genres, a series of elements comprises the features of the sufferer defining his face, this is due to the mistake of seeing it as a straightjacket which imprisons images by immediate adhesion to identity strategies. Besides, this perspective leads also to over-emphasizing the relation between image and spectator, and even eliminates the expressive aspects of photography, although immersed in a negotiation context typical of the media field, given its possibility of establishing other relationships.

According to a pragmatic notion of the model such as that offered by Agamben (1993, 15), its functioning is not restricted to identity processes, but merely exhibits the very logic of belonging as an ambiguous modality defined by language. In accordance with the set theory in modern logic, Agamben (1993) stresses that the definition of a set is simply the definition of its linguistic meaning. “The antinomy between the individual and the universal has its origins in language. (…) The comprehension of each distinct object m into a whole M is no more than a name.” (AGAMBEN, 1993, p. 15). The paradox of classes defines solely the place of the linguistic being. It is not to-be-red, to-be-Italian, to-be-communist, but rather to-be-said-red, to-be-said-Italian, that defines the model. If the nature of the model is to belong and not to belong simultaneously, it cannot be taken as an exclusively particular or universal reference, but being a singularity, it can allow only the vision
of a state, not of a condition. “The model being is the purely linguistic being.” (AGAMBEN, 1993, p. 16). It is no more than the linguistic being and its main function is to show itself as such: to exhibit itself, to highlight all of its indetermination, in its own inconstancy.

In this way, Agamben displaces and widens the comprehension of the functioning of the model, making evident the decisive role of language for an identity definition. It is possible to see the singular in the model, as long as we understand that singularity does not imply having one or another characteristic that justifies or qualifies the Other’s belonging to a set or class. The model cannot be transformed into an identity, marked by the strictness or sedentarism of a character, but it can be conceived of as a category through which it is possible to catch a glimpse of the traits of an ordinary singularity, when it is understood that the model is improper and its importance lies in exhibition, in showing itself as it is. “The place of the example is always beside itself, in the empty space where its unqualified and unforgetable life unfolds. This life is the purely linguistic life.” (AGAMBEN, 1993, p. 16).

When thinking of the image field, or more specifically of photojournalism, the necessary inversion is that of the model as a sufferer and not of the sufferer as a model. Identity always leads to individuality judgments. Instead of mistaking the sufferer for the attributes that surround him, through descriptive devices from the media that defines him as persona, it is advisable to pay careful attention to expressive procedures that photograph uses in order to exhibit its many subjects. However, this does not mean that this task is enough to guarantee the possibility of encountering a singular imbued with identity or even in the forms proposed by Agamben, but once the functioning mode of the model, freed from the restrictive conditions imposed by language, is understood, a wider, lacunary, interactional relationship between image (and the Other of the image) and spectator takes on importance.

The perspective of image as an inter-worlds mediator of he who sees and he who is seen, between the dimensions of the ambience with the spectator, sketches the traits of a concrete encounter (not always harmonic, but sometimes tense and conflictive), a material one and not an image in which the positions are charted and the only task is to recognize the figureless subject as a discourse object. What is at stake here is not only to describe an overview of identity and hegemonic lines of power by means of which narrative strategies and language operations of part of photojournalism act. Nor is it to believe that each represented subject indicates singular dignity, but if something singular is still to be seen in
an image, it should be understood that the subject (in its multiplicity) is always that which results from the relationship with the device, or at least it is that which remains from this encounter (AGAMBEN, 2009, p. 41).

**The figure that does not communicate: possible displacement in the domain of forms**

The sufferer in photojournalism presupposes a character. Usually highlighted by a portrait, the figureless protagonist of the event bears in his physiognomy an expression that is related to the context of the happening or indicates a kind of passion that uplifts it as a “circumstance portrait”, as said by Picado (2009).

The physiognomy recognition (object either of an individual or a type) is something that in photojournalism is always to be assimilated with the most peculiar functions of the discourse system that operates through these images: in its interior (but also in the time systems on which the genesis of image and its functions depend), prevails the notion that the objects are comprehended in the context of an action or a passion, in which they constitute themselves, in image, as traits that impregnate the faces and the bodies (PICADO, 2009, p. 279).

Yet, even if the plastic-narrative arrangement is anchored on a possible interpretation, one pertinent to the general protocols of photojournalism, a set of images embedded in the same context as its discourse operations can be considered by other means, different from that of textual meaning which individualizes the (figureless) subject by personalizing and particularizing it, but rather a different or new arrangement that emphasizes, in the field of expression, the nature of the encounter between the person in the image and the spectator, as a happening, open and lacunary, constituted by the capability of affection. It is a matter of *haecceity*, whose “body is not defined by the form that determines it, or as a substance of a certain subject, or by the organs it possesses or the functions it accomplishes.” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997, p. 47).

In this context, the relationship between ambience and body offers the possibility of an experience displaced from the frames of reference via the feeling of strangeness, via the tense and borderline aspect of its subjects, at the same time victim and resister, staging and reality, excess and vestige.

Picture 1 presents the winning photograph of one of the greatest international photojournalism prizes, *World Press Photo*, year 2010. With a different posture from that presented by most press portraits featuring sufferers, the woman is submitted without any context or situation in direct relation to the fact that caused her strange face. With no nose, but
with a dark hollow in evidence, this woman is not acting as a sufferer, but shows herself as she is. Her gaze does not seem to encourage compassion, pity or solidarity. Not even fear and horror are at stake here. However, her gaze is eloquent, inquiring, but with no apparent appeal to any emotional resource. She does not dramatize, nor does she dissimulate, nor merely describe herself as a female subjected to religious, moral and family systems.

If with a minimal cultural knowledge of certain Islamic customs involving women, either assassins or adulteresses, etc., an interpretation key can be accessed in which this knowledge participates as an element that creates even more tension in this encounter with the Other, on the other hand, something of her presence escapes the frames of classifying representation. Even though the controlled appearance constitutes a special form of power practice in the manner of contemporary capitalism, in which the ocultation or exhibition of a face always creates simultaneous political and aesthetic tension, this arrangement is not capable of completely subliming certain images with relation to their special and singular aspects. Here, all possible identity discourse is betrayed by the look in the eyes. There is nothing more intimate and singular than the presence established by the eyes; they are the ones that affect us and
offer us another sensation, as a slightly varying perception of what is strange or intolerable. It is in this frail, precarious, inconstant threshold that a bit of this Other, as it is, can be glimpsed.

Without the crutches provided by a narrative that aids the precise reconstruction of why, how, where, when, for whom or by which way did this woman reach this state, at the moment she lets herself be shown, exhibited, photographed, turned into an image, she puts herself face-to-face with someone equally Other, without “becauses” passing through this silent dialogue of the eyes. A dialogue with no language, no purpose, as a suspension, an encounter led by the single movement in the trajectory of the eyes, strolling through the details of a face in all of its strangeness and shyness. There is a sharing of a brief, precarious, swift intimacy. The framing in the foreground interdicts a zone, but also allows for approaches. Its effect is not caused by the lopped-off organ, but by seeing something as it is, by participating in this account of the self given in image, through image.

By now, photojournalism cannot be seen as the mere exhibition of daily facts, real life and ordinary subjects, because the evidence we experience comes from another order of happenings. The very nature of image gains its strength from the pragmatic relationship of seeing/being seen; this is not achieved simply by showing reality as it is, not as an overlapping reality, but by offering a reality that passes through the image, left as the remains of another happening, the factual one. As well observed by Picado (2009), images from photojournalism are a mixture of surrender and staging of reality.

There are, therefore, two orders of happenings: one in which the subject was struck, the other belonging to the current relationship involved in vision, a relationship between image and spectator, that which affects and that which is affected. This perspective makes the spectator at the same time an active subject in the relationship, not only the one who reads the codes, the one who recognizes them, but as the one who takes a place on his/her own, the one who has been “displaced from a certain contemplative order to become an active subject, inserted into a political place marked by a gesture where the contact occurs by the sharing of gazes” (MONDZAIN, 2007, p. 203).

It is through this relationship that the sufferer as an empirical subject, a young Islamist who had her nose lopped off, seems to break away from the pure form of what is personal and individual, but not by entering exclusively into the format of a universal, general, identified, stigmatized class or group of women. “She is the one who offers herself and communicates by means of the gaze.” (AGAMBEN, 2007, p. 75). Her
existence seems to be a paradox, on the very threshold, on the borders between what is ruled in and ruled out by class, genre, ethnicity, identity, condition, nature. Her nature is open, her relationships contingent.

The same attraction and participation promoted by the gaze characterizes Picture 2. We are drafted to return, even if for just a brief period, to this gaze that sustains the threshold between life and death, between to be and not to be, in complete suspension. The thoroughly black eyes, the very pale and wrinkled hands that no longer seem to be able to grab the piece of wood in front, face the spectator with puzzling uncertainty regarding life/death. Even the possibility of noticing some delicacy in the boy’s face cannot suppress that which is indicated by the eyes. Personage and image merge as a frail uncertain record of life/death at its limit, co-existing in this in-between where individual life faces universal death. No pity, no indulgence, no drama.

It is a kind of haecceity that comes no longer from individualization, but from singularity: it is a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, since only the subject that embodied it could make it good or bad. The life of this individuality fades away in favor of the singular life that is immanent to a man who no longer has a name, one who does not mistake himself for any other [man]. Singular essence, a life... (DELEUZE, 2001, p. 28).

Thus, images are cast by a dialogism that sparks them, in which certain manners, a gaze, a smile or a gesture can be found as a particularity, as a singular element, not as a subjective characteristic.
After all, “a life is everywhere” (DELEUZE, 2001, p. 28).

In this special manner of physiognomic presence, a face shatters into fragments, it cannot bear an identity, it breaks away from the single purpose of an example and widens the horizon of its possibilities; it exhibits its own constitution of possibilities, of multiple faces, finally of an “anyone” singularity. Such slight variations, which may seem insignificant in relation to the massive identity projects perpetuated by the media, act with expressive intensity. Here, we can say, micro-politics of resistance may arise, reinventing the systems of enunciation in image, through image, surpassing genre, dispersing the serial identities project.

Under these circumstances, the greater task for resistance would be to turn the refuse of ordinary bodies, the refuse to go on following the serial-making machine, into something to be asserted, distributed and experimented, in a way so as not to make it a rule, significance or territory which can handle displacement very poorly. In this way, the failures of the body, in a disciplinary activity and [the failure] of turning desire into identity, seem now to no longer function as a symptom that subjectivities must be narrowed, but that social relationships need to be transformed and that subjectivation needs to be re-singularized. One can notice here the redimensioning of power organizations around another type of non-homogeneous demands, which favors the reinvention of the individual body and of the social body on the grounds of another political potency that now has life as its criterion (PEIXOTO JÚNIOR, 2005, p. 61).

These brief notes lead us into thinking about the Other that affects us (brought about by image) and about the way we understand the communicative qualifications implied in the relationships of seeing the Other. Thus, affection always turns ethics into a possible experience.

| NOTES |

1 The intended discussion is based rather on the perspective of mediation considering its incomplete, relational and interactive nature, as suggested by José Luiz Braga. It is based on this consideration that some aspects are trivialized and one undertakes a more profitable discussion, either for reflecting on photojournalism as a place for production of visibilities, or for reflecting on what this field signifies - the view of the spectator, the spot where the interaction and completeness of the communication process are fulfilled (BRAGA, 2006).

2 According to Agamben, the singular subject, the anyone, is one totally destitute of particular attributes, who is not included in a class or does not fall into general categories. Neither exclusively individual nor universal, the singular subject is rather anyone as long as it is such as it is. However, if we share this conception of singular insofar as it is not a matter of properties
or attributes of a subject, as suggested by Agamben, on the other hand we do not comprehend his conception as different and opposed to identity. Instead, we share the indication of what is common, according to Denilson Lopes, where identity is seen as a relational construction, both historical and unstable, which incorporates residues, which is not blocked by but crosses over cultures, which is not qualified by humanism but fulfills what is possible in a “precarious fraternity” (LOPES, 2010).

3 According to the researcher Jorge Pedro Sousa, photojournalism establishes itself as part of the history of journalistic information with the intention of witnessing and documenting facts. Starting only from the 80’s is it possible to notice what he calls “photojournalism revolution”, in which the production of images does not pursue universal truth, in accordance with a type of “realistic humanism”, but instead focuses on the spectator retaining “poliphonic cultural diversity, with cumplicity between creator and spectator” (SOUSA, 2004).

4 In the text O sofrimento em imagens: uma história entre a fotografia e a política [Suffering in images: a history between photography and politics], the author shows, with historical appeal, the relationship established by the diffusion of images of suffering linked to the paradigms of modern politics (PEREIRA, 2008).

5 We wish to highlight the importance of the commentary developed by César Guimarães with regard to understanding the singular as an analysis category, one possible in image. Even if his discussion belongs to the documentary field, many of his indications concerning the articulation between the image’s Other and the concept of singularity proposed by Agamben are useful for the rather applied reflection we make here (GUIMARÃES, 2006, p. 38-48).

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Angie Biondi is Ph.D. Research student at the Postgraduate Program in Social Communication at the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). Researcher of the Research Group on Image and Sociability (GRIS/UFMG)