ABSTRACT – As a subject in communication, journalism is part of a course of recognition. In such course, journalism is historically conditioned to articulate a series of strategies to reveal the “competencies” of an institution that seeks to be perceived as more reliable and/or truthful than others, legitimating its authority. Based on this assumption, this article discusses some theoretical and methodological approaches to journalism that takes its devices into account. This is an attempt to pave the way for drawing a historical overview of a course inherent in what we perceive as “truth” of the institution itself, present in its self-legitimating discourses.

Keywords: journalism; recognition; discourse; authority; self-legitimation.
The goal of this article is to outline a theoretical and methodological approach, a pathway to guide the analysis of a history of the truth of and in journalism, and its processes of self-legitimation. Therefore, we propose some possibilities from studies that seek to understand journalism as a subject in communication (Leal, 2009). When talking about journalism we refer to a “modern” ideal of an institution that has been built historically under a series of common standards and practices shared by its agents, seeking recognition, legitimacy and authority. (Traquina, 2005) Even so, we are aware that journalism, as an “ism” (Nerone, 2009; 2012) containing a series of assumptions and belief systems, should be perceived in its particularities.

Outlining the process of institutionalization of a truth of and in journalism requires us to understand it as an activity situated in the struggles for recognition. Such struggles are connected to stories that are told and, thus, build traditions and ideals of what would be the “good” and the “true” model to be practiced and recognized as such. (Zelizer, 1992) That said, we do not deny that there are several ways to define the so-called modern institution of journalism. Our concern is to define what we can still characterize as “mainstream press” in Brazil. The route we are about to follow was constructed to discuss how this institution has been seeking recognition as a type of journalism that considers itself as more truthful, professional and
reliable than others. Thus, by outlining this route, our goal is not necessarily to discuss what this kind of journalism actually is, but to build a framework of analysis to understand what it intends to be based on an ideal type of institution that seeks legitimation in, with and through time.

As a general concept, the idea of journalism that we seek to analyze here is related to its “generalizations” and “similarities” that, historically, allow us to understand its polysemic character as well as its semantic plasticity (Koselleck, 2006). Therefore, we do not assume an ideal type of institution as a sort of prescribed formula, but as abstractions that allow us to build historical relationships inherent in the struggles for recognition (Prost, 2015). John Nerone (2012) makes clear, e.g. that idealized standards of modern western journalism do not actually describe what journalism is or what journalists do, since they only operate as idealizations of how “perfect agents” should act in “perfect situations”.

In this sense, it is important to emphasize that this article does not address a deep theoretical discussion on the truth about/in journalism and its ethical and/or deontological implications – even though these issues are inherent in the course. That is because this study is not necessarily focused on discussing the journalistic practice as a theory itself, but in articulating ways of analyzing journalism historically, incorporating it into its struggles for recognition. When talking about journalism we first think of newspapers as an institutional and self-referential voice, a device that involves and conditions its daily practice in the form of the news narrative. The issue of truth will be treated here as a truth that intends to be on the level of recognition, connected to memory and its history (Barbosa, 2016; Kitch, 2014; Ribeiro, 2005; Zandberg, 2010). A truth that concerns primarily the authority of the institution that produces such discourses and is placed in the arenas of symbolic legitimation (Habermas, 2004; Rorty, 2007; Lisboa and Benetti, 2015).

In times of “post-truth”, media companies appear to be increasingly concerned about making evident on what premises “true” journalism is based, under which their daily practices are articulated. In a context of apparent crisis of credibility, so-called “professional” journalism has sought the support of a “legitimating machine” (Berger and Luckmann, 2003) in an attempt to attribute to itself a number of competencies that make it recognized as holder of more legitimate and reliable discourses. “More and better journalism” — as proclaimed
by *The New York Times*, one of the strongholds and defenders of this model, referring to the delicate context faced by the company in the coverage of the recent political situation in their country³.

From this brief scenario, what we propose here is a study that seeks to articulate interpretative tools for the analysis of a course where, historically, struggles for recognition take place. Struggles that seek, above all, to attribute greater legitimacy to an institution that proclaims itself as capable of revealing the truth of the events that occur in the world, thus asserting its authority. Journalism, as a subject in communication, can only make itself credible by pointing out its competencies in relation to another, the reason for its discourse. Hereafter, as we follow this course together, our approach will become clearer.

**Course of recognition:**

*a theoretical and methodological approach*

First of all, it is important to point out that by mentioning “recognition” we follow the theoretical path proposed by Ricoeur (2006) in a study on the semantic status of the term in the philosophical sphere. According to the author, there is a clear gap in this field of thought to the point that it is not possible to identify a specific theory of recognition. For that reason, Ricoeur starts his analysis strictly in the linguistic field. Assuming that there is a lack of polysemous organization of the term, Ricoeur distinguishes a number of possibilities for its definition: recognition as something that one redisdiscovers, that identifies and/or arises to one’s mind again; recognition as a perception of something that has never been seen before; recognition as something that one considers as true, as recognition involves a matter of acceptance, assessment and submission (authority); recognition as a form of gratitude, among several other possibilities inferred directly from its etymological structure.

By discussing this wide range of definitions, the author attempts to shift the analysis of recognition as an active verb (“to recognize”) to a passive one (“to be recognized”), a conceptual re-interpretation that, according to him, offers the chance to analyze how the “struggles for recognition” occur – a key point for the debates in the arenas of symbolic legitimation. The issue of the “struggle for recognition” is appropriated by Ricoeur from the analysis made.
by Axel Honneth (2009), who in turn re-interprets the concept previously discussed by Hegel (1991). But Honneth (2009) is not strictly focused on understanding these struggles as strategies for the self-preservation or legitimation of identities, an assumption that can be found in Maquiavel and Hobbes’ modern social philosophy, for example. His analysis is guided by a reflection on the normative model of social struggle, where the conflicts for mutual recognition relate more directly to a moral question than to a question of power. For Hegel (1991), recognition refers to ethical relations and supportive recognition, involving people’s freedom, individually and collectively. According to this philosophy, the discussion is much more related to the social bonds between subjects and to their struggles to prove the integrity of a “morality” worthy of being recognized.

We are more concerned, here, about the authority that guides the supposed intentions of these relationships rather than the solidarity/ethnicity expected from them. This is why we rather dialogue with Ricoeur’s premise (2006). This brings us, in advance, to the question of identity as, from this assumption, recognition is nothing but a “request to be recognized” as what one declares and/or intends to be. Recognizing becomes an act that “expresses an ambition, a claim to practice intellectual control over the field of signification, of significative assertions.” (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 28) The search for recognition is, therefore, a demand that implies expectations, since it can only be fulfilled as “mutual recognition”, whether on the level of utopic ambitions or on the political level.

Following the delimitation of a field, Ricoeur (2006) proposes some philosophical definitions to guide this path which can be summed up by the following proposition: recognizing, as identification of oneself, by seeking to be recognized and distinguished from the other, shares a common identity, a self-identity that seeks above all else the recognition in its relationship with the other. Switching “recognize” as a verb to “recognition” as a noun concerns an aspiration that involves struggles for legitimation. One will only be recognized if distinguished and identified by what one intends to say that they are. This theoretical inflection seems fundamental, as our intention is not to understand whether “recognition” in journalism is indeed legitimate or not, but rather to understand how, by defining a common identity, its discourses “demand” to be recognized, how they seek these spheres of recognition and legitimation before their audience.
From this process we do not come out unaffected. We are agents, as we recognize ourselves as capable of identifying and distinguishing ourselves and, for that, we suffer for attributing to the other the desire of being recognized. This is how Ricoeur (2006) understands the “passivity” of the verb. The struggle for recognition does not occur without the other. Only by addressing the other one can expect that what they “intend to be” can be considered “true” or not. Thus, a few attributes need to be taken into account in this path “from recognizing to being recognized”: the first aspect is to identify oneself as capable of being. Agents that seek to be recognized attribute to themselves “competencies” that characterize them as bearers of the “power of saying” and/or the “power of doing”. The “capable human being”, according to Ricoeur (2006), is the one who says “I can” as someone who knows his legitimate competencies. It is an agent that recognizes its responsibilities and considers them as supposedly “true”, because they define its identity.

The very act of appointing oneself implies an attempt to make them recognizable. Ricoeur (2006) dialogues with John Austin’s speech act theory (1962) in which the author assumes that speaking, pointing to and attributing responsibility to a discourse, means “to do things with words”. Ricoeur (2006, p. 110) believes this pragmatic concept is valuable, because it extends the strictly semantic idea of the value of the statement in order to understand “the particular concepts of dialogue” that occur in the games of enunciation and their enunciators. They are acts of discourse that switch the attention from “what is said” to think about “who says” in their process of self-designation.

To nominate oneself as holder of the power of saying or doing means to distinguish them as an authorized agent. “I can” concerns a subject who acts under supposed intentions and that, by seeking recognition, intends to be recognized as a maximum cause of discourse, as a sort of “I did it”. However, between causes and intentions it is necessary to understand that the authorized subject affirms, above all, that they “know how to do it” since they are defined as capable of performing such function. Ricoeur (2006) states that these designations require the idea of one’s own narrative identity, as if the personal identity of a subject could reflect the very possibility of this power to narrate oneself, reflecting in the discourse the very expectations attributed in the act of saying. It is in this way that a reader, for example, can also identify as such in the very act of that which asks to be recognized.
Regarding the power of designation of this capable human being, there is still a question to be solved: the competency of attributing and authorizing oneself in a discourse that is directly related to the responsibility of the one who speaks. Responsibility in the sense that if one puts expectations on something they say, they have the “obligation” to defend the supposed “truths” that they require. These “truths” are built and re-signified based on trust, credibility and legitimation in an always troubled relationship with the other. Therefore, we can place the struggle for recognition in a present that is both compressed and expanded between memory (a past as experience) and the promise (a future as expectation) (Koselleck, 2006). It is in this relationship that the maintenance of the logic of “to recognize - to be recognized” occurs: One affirms oneself as capable of doing; Gives give themselves identities related to their experience; promise; creates expectations; One does; One is recognized as authorized to bear these “truths”.

Even though in this theoretical route we are talking about a “recognition of oneself”, it is the oneself as an other (Ricoeur, 2014) that emerges here, in the sense that we can only think about the ambitions of its validation from the relationships that are attributed to it. This is why Ricoeur (2006) considers that the question of “mutual recognition” comes into play. One defines oneself as capable and authorized only because they wish to be recognized. Only by demanding from the other the final responsibility for this journey one can, as a subject, complete a course of recognition. Recognition is attestation, legitimacy that is intended to another. It is not enough to just desire and be able to say supposed truths, it is necessary to confront them in games of discursive validation. The “capable human being” proposed by Ricoeur (2006) is the one who, rather than having the power, desires. But if one desire that is because they “trust” in their competencies, as this path aims for social esteem above all, recognition and consideration. The most important thing at the end of this struggle becomes, therefore, not recognition in the sense that “one recognizes” their authority, but in authorizing oneself to say that “one is recognized”, for they are considered reliable and “true”.

Understanding journalism’s “competencies” in its legitimating machinery, how it defines for itself an identity of its own and how it “asks” to be recognized, will be one of the aims of our pathway. The “capable human being” in the context of journalism has been explored in a study by Benetti and Freitas (2015), where the authors reflected on
the construction and uses of memory from Ricoeur’s phenomenology (2007). In an attempt to understand the “desirable skills” of a journalist subject involved in ethical actions and commitment to the truth of their reports, the analysis in question sought to understand how journalism should be committed to a number of premises that, at least theoretically, guide its work.”

The journalist, as a “capable human being”, should thus be imbued with the potential to identify, prioritize, organize and make the past events available in a present that is constantly expanding into possible futures. Being aware of this, one of its main responsibilities would be to “build memory”, a legitimate and credible memory that assists on the elucidation of the pluralities of these events and that enables the inclusion of men in their time. By attributing to himself a power of action, the journalist establishes his own authority, an authority that demands, consequentially, the responsibility of recognition to the other. Hence the importance, according to the authors, that these competencies be guided by an ethical desire for otherness and justice. A commitment to those to whom the discourse is addressed. (Benetti and Freitas, 2015)

These premises, essential to the journalistic practice, demand from subjects the capacity to take stands before the delimited spacial and temporal contexts. Only in this way can the journalist transpose in narrative the complexity of the world that he identifies and reports. By recognizing themselves and the other by the narrative act, the agents should be able to enhance the “discursive construction of the world” (Benetii and Freitas, 2015, p. 179), producing memories that make the continuities and ruptures with time evident.

Although we do not overlook the potential inherent to these practices, for us what seems essential in this course is to understand how journalism legitimates a place from the very memories that it (re)produces and reports. As a “capable human being” that intends to “be recognized”, journalism seeks, besides building memory, to legitimate and to establish its place “in history” (Barbosa, 2016). A place in history that it narrates, by the profusion of its events, but also a place before the history of the institution itself that it is said to belong and represent. This is why, in this course, more important than thinking about how journalism is or should be, it becomes necessary to apprehend how it has intended to be from the image that journalism itself attempts to build as an institution. More than a practice, we are questioning, therefore, the role of journalism and
newspapers, its image and institutional voice that legitimate it as a subject *in* communication, for we see it here as an actor which is also conditioned to the vicissitudes of time, in the constant conflict between memory and oblivion.

**Recognition as the “image of oneself”: the newspaper and its voice**

Going down this path seems essential for a reflection on what we seek to define as an idea of truth “about” journalism and to discuss the “who speaks” of discourse in its supposed intentions. In this sense, we attempt to understand how newspapers construct a sort of “system of representation of oneself” (Benetti and Hagen, 2010) that bunches them together as an institutional voice of what would be “true” journalism which they practice and in which they play a part. In a course of recognition, journalism, as an institution, articulates its “image of oneself” through particular characteristics. Regulations and “terms of convenience” that define competencies, strategies of distinction aimed at make it recognized and to differentiate it from other agents and institutions. (Nerone, 2013) As a particular “discursive genre” (Benetti, 2008), journalism exists only in this relationship established by a “contract” of communication (Charaudeau, 2006) that forces us to think about the “who says and to whom” in a text, under its ambitions and goals, and anchored under its institutional premises or images.

The image of oneself designed in discourse is what reaffirms and legitimates beliefs, defining the conditioning of the newspapers’ and the institution of journalism’s identity as the bearer of a “truth” worthy of being recognized as such. But the contract of communication established between the agents and the audience is not always symmetric, due to the relationship of power that each has in this field. When one “asks” to be recognized one is nothing more than – in theory – reiterating and reaffirming truths that end up legitimating a “particular” journalistic ethos. It is thus that an institution legitimates itself as “objective reality” (Berger and Luckmann, 2003), but then it is necessary that a series of actors – both the papers and the journalists themselves – constantly reproduce this image from an ethos that would be “pre-discursive” and which would delimit a particular system of self-representation (Benetti and Hagen, 2010).5
This image, it is important to stress, constructs a representation of the institution and not necessarily the reality of conducting journalism. As an image, however, it is a powerful instrument for crystallizing identities and, consequently, legitimating the authority of journalism. Before turning to others in search of recognition, this kind of journalism calls itself “capable” and, therefore, defines itself through strategies of self-referencing. These strategies delimit and negotiate spaces, reinforce values, and configure and reconfigure memories. They are fundamental to defining what the institution is and how it should, above all, be identified.

Discourses such as these can be viewed often as a vertical statement, with a unique voice, that labels itself as capable and a bearer of a universal narrative, which are also “strategies of defense” (Lopes, 2007). But if one seeks strategies to back up a discourse, obviously one is defending oneself from something or someone and, in this sense, they should not exclude the other under which the discourse of “I can” is dialogically implicit. In this relationship which is under the guise of intention, one cannot abandon the assumption that the “image of oneself” of journalism is not isolated, removed from text and context. One is only “oneelf”, as incorporated into a contract which directs and projects the other (Ricoeur, 2014).

Journalism’s self-legitimating discourses should be regarded for its historicity since – we are aware – many of those voices emanate a certain “essentialist” feeling, looking for acting as “prescriptions” for what journalism in fact “should be” (Jácome, 2014, p. 56). These prescriptions, according to the author, deny the multiplicity constituent in journalism, connecting it to an ideal type, a bearer of a permanent and unchanging way of being, reflected in an institution’s discourses based on exemption, independence, professionalism, commitment to democracy, etc. However, if we seek to discuss a kind of journalism that intends to be, we seek for interpretative loopholes in the way journalism defines itself. From this assumption it does not mean to deny its historicity, but to understand how this journalism, by defining an identity of or for the institution, conflicts with a reality that is intrinsic to what takes place in journalism. Meaning: the institution’s discourse, which is defined as “real” journalism, does not always reflect a truth in journalism. By staying aware that the discourses of journalism often end up deliberately freezing its own historicity we can understand how its supposed intentions are established merged in practice.
Once again it is worth reiterating that with this route, we only seek ways to identify the “capabilities” of a sort of journalism that labels itself legitimate and authorized to conduct itself as such. An image and an institutional voice dialogue in this way with the “truths” that intend to be established as recognized before a certain audience over time. As in a “capable human being”, journalism is constructed under a relationship that is always conflicted between experiences and expectations, memory and forgetfulness. Upon asking to be recognized, journalism’s self-referential discourse moves in time, in discourses and memories about oneself in an attempt to incorporate itself “into history” (Barbosa, 2016) and distinguish itself from a common identity in its relationship with the others.

This is why a course of recognition has to be understood as, essentially, a historic route, spanning what journalism understands itself as in pursuit of self-legitimation in, with and through time. This assumption can give us clues to historicize the values of the institution, and understand its particularities, continuities and ruptures. When journalism advocates a truth to itself, as “the” truth of the institution, we must understand the “historical processes” that make necessary these struggles for recognition and legitimation. These cases are not impervious and end up constantly renewing assurances of a “modern constitution” of its identity (Jácime, 2014).

Despite the concern in diagnosing the historicity of these processes, Leal and Jácome (2016) are aware, for example, that journalism’s institutional discourses, in their ruptures and continuities, often construct themselves as a sort of change that “remains the same”. They are self-legitimating discourses that seek to explain the process of modernization of the press by itself, reaffirming the principles that, in a way, simplify its historicity. But this is also a fundamental strategy to re-signify standards and values for them to endure through time, legitimating the objective reality of a process of institutionalization (Berger and Luckmann, 2003). Such processes end up making these relations, in many cases, somewhat complex and paradoxical.

Discussing strategies of legitimation as a process that “asks” to be recognized demands, therefore, a number of assumptions that are not limited to a specific type of journalism, as we confront it for what it intends to define itself. Fausto Neto (2008) calls attention to how the “mediatic journalistic” field is incorporated into a series of practices involving other functioning organizational systems. The
strategies of legitimacy as well as the practices used in the field for the pursuit of recognition are permeated by processes that complexify their place in specific speech. Thus, the “representational place” of journalism needs to be relativized, since it becomes necessary to shift its protagonism and autonomy to other places that are not solely and exclusively owned by it.

According to the author, the mediatization of processes of communication involve a reconfiguration of the very discourse of journalism, as well as of its practices and interactions before the public. Its techno-symbolic operation, through a series of new "regimes of contact", started to demand another enunciative and self-referential posture which concerns the “device” it carries, in what the author defines as a “reality of construction”. This reality is affected by different fields responsible for transforming its own representational device. “It is in the complexity of this ‘reality of construction’ that a new ‘educational model’ and discursive market [where journalism reconfigures itself] establishes its status of an ‘observational place’” (Fausto Neto, 2008, p. 115).

The reconfiguration of a place directly concerns the ways that journalism defines and “constructs” its autonomy, which also happens through a discursive and self-referential nature between the device and its connections. This is possible, according to the author, by the production of a “self-reflexivity” on the “ways of being” of journalism (Fausto Neto, 2008), an enunciation designed to describe its own reality through discursive operations that end up developing something like a “metadiscourse” on journalism, its actors and practices.

The author believes that these “metadiscourses” are nothing more than strategies of celebration and consecration of journalism, responsible for showing a “reality of construction”, its dynamic operation, identity and autonomy. They are strategies in which journalism ends up updating its existence and possibilities of permanence before the production of meaning, since they are circumscribed onto “the ‘epic’ of its actors, according to which the field not only makes history, but calls attention to how this history goes.” (Fausto Neto, 2008, p. 116) It is the discourse of oneself, therefore, that endows journalism with its own self-reflexivity – Discourses of oneself and others, since they aim for the legitimation of an autonomy and an identity “capable” of being recognized as such. Journalism as institution “constructs” itself and needs to make
this explicit in discourse, with the intention of creating connections and relationships.

Hence the importance of the issue of the “device” that adapts the meanings produced by a newspaper to a specific support of enunciation. Here Mouillaud’s interpretation (2002) about the devices seems fundamental as the author believes that a “device” cannot be seen solely as a technical support that ensures visibility and projection to those enunciated, but as something that, above all, involves them. They are matrices where the texts are inscribed, but where they are already pre-inscribed, as the functioning of a device demands the relation of symbolic meaning that ends up engraving a specific “name” to the newspaper. A device, therefore, bears experiences and expectations, since its meanings are incorporated into a historical context. It is, according to the author, a sort of “packaging” that involves the symbolic dimension of the product, as a perfume and its bottle, where one is inherently related to the other. From these principles, Leal (2009) believes that a newspaper, incorporated into its device, has an identity and its own voice which goes beyond the news or a certain set of texts.

Thus, it is possible to identify a “general discursive voice” of each vehicle to the point that we can define them as a particular “semiotic subject”. To identify a voice concerns a theoretical-methodological problem that seeks to trace characteristics and particularities to a discursive agent, endowing it with some specific attributes able to ensure its cohesion. But how do we recognize it beyond the apparent unity of news? How do we relate the space of news inherent to the structure of the paper with the other spaces that delimit its outline and context? According to the author, only once we understand journalism as a social phenomenon belonging to a device that involves and makes sense of itself will we be able to “identify” its voice. This occurs once we realize that the media’s discourse is dictated by specific conditions of production as they are incorporated into a “contract of communication” (Charaudeau, 2006) between the agents of enunciation and the public.

In this sense, we refer to a newspaper when we delimit and define it from the codes which characterize it. Such codes are not necessarily limited to discourse, that which is written in text, but also to its political implications and meanings that are historically and socially set up from these relationships. They are benchmarks that
operate as a kind of matrix that encompass the practices in various forms to the point that we can identify “who speaks” in the discourse, which would be the supposed subject of the enunciation that seeks to be recognized in its name. But if we speak of a condition of production of discourse, we also talk about narrative, which would be the marks of this route of enunciation. That makes us think that what we define as a “voice” characteristic to a particular paper is related to what is said and how it is said, so that it can be distinguished from others on the level of an identity that it is own (Leal, 2009).

If in a course of recognition, from “recognition” to “being recognized”, one needs to be identified, they can only do so, obviously, by imbuing oneself with characteristics that define them as such. This means to demand expectations from an experience, to deal with a supposed credibility, legitimacy and authority that is all about stating its daily practice. These traits, as Leal (2009) believes, distinguishes the paper in its name from mere news. While the news needs constant feedback, the newspaper needs repetition, be it on the “visible” level (as it is presented graphically and structurally, for example) or on the level of the “coherence” of its positioning. These attributes are constructed historically and intend to legitimize “capabilities” that will be recognized before a given portion of readers.

The paper’s name creates fundamental “links”, so that they are placed in the struggle for recognition. A newspaper, its articles, what it states and that under which it defines itself are, therefore, components of a specific type of saying and doing that would be “of” journalism and which guarantees specificity. Still, we’d be dealing with two different types of devices, that “of” journalism, (the paper itself) and others inscribed “in” journalism (as a form of news). In an analysis that intends to go beyond the news, it is therefore necessary to search for what escapes from the supposed “familiarity” of a voice that repeats itself. That which constructs itself daily “in” journalism is not unbound from a larger device which involves it and which involves what the newspaper and journalism itself claims to be and to represent. This is why a possible “general voice” of journalism can only be identified in this complex and not always apparent relationship, which sometimes ends up naturalizing itself in the discourse. (Leal, 2009)

To search for the identity of a newspaper requires still, as Leal and Carvalho (2014) stress, to be attentive to some subtleties that distance us from “essentializations” typical to those studies
that intend to, for example, define a periodical for its unequivocal editorial policy and/or for criteria of newsworthiness and agenda setting. A newspaper bares a “split identity” based on the plurality of voices, in different narrative and aesthetic structures as well as diverse ideological divides, as there are cracks in the apparent regularity under which the paper is presented. The same event is usually presented by the paper in a number of ways, often mutually contradictory. It is as if, the authors believe, a newspaper was a sort of “apartment complex”, where other “newspapers” live, identified by its columnists and sections in which it is possible to perceive certain idiosyncrasies that “sometimes echoes the paper’s editorial policies, and other times adopt autonomous approaches that seem to belong to another publication.” (Leal and Carvalho, 2014, p. 151)

All this reflection on the character conflict that involves the devices and their voices is directly linked to a position on how to situate the issue of the self-referencing of journalism in relation to their identities and the truths which intend on being legitimate. When a paper defines itself as able to assume a determined position suggesting a certain “editorial coherence”, we need to be aware that this apparent unity has been constructed in an increasingly fluid and contradictory way (Leal and Carvalho, 2014). That is necessary not only because a newspaper must be understood in its plural power, proving its variety, but because it must be perceived, above all else, in its historicity built in, with and through time. The papers carry a voice that spreads, branches and echoes, some more resonant than others. Seeking coherence in this tangle of intentions and identifying a “general voice” to the speaker is only possible if we are aware of the historical transformations and re-configurations under which these newspapers are conditioned (Leal, 2009).

We must not condone, therefore, a sense of identity which envisages these processes as an immutable and ahistoric form. The establishment of a voice under which a paper is defined occurs between continuities and ruptures which are often silenced by narratives of institutional self-legitimation, inherent to a truth that journalism intends on defining as its own. This course does not occur as a “one-way street” and that is why it becomes important to contrast what journalism is, under a supposed general voice, to the intermittent narratives that are built in journalism, which are not always perceived in its apparent unity.
The pathway from recognizing oneself as a voice to a pretension of being recognized cannot be diagnosed by its occasionality. If, as Leal (2009, p. 121) asserts, a voice necessarily implies a socially and ideologically marked discursive position, it is because we need to reflect on “what place the medium proposes to itself, with whom it speaks and why. [...] the voice of the medium, less than specific matters – as in the news – seems to arise, revealing it as subject in communication.”

As subjects in communication, newspapers are incorporated into journalism and its history. Between that history and the agents that constitute it a relationship is established which happens in constant negotiation. A subject in communication is one that acts dialogically, circumscribed in a specific context of enunciation and conditioned by its historicity. To speak of a journalism which intends to be and which labels itself as capable of legitimating a truth about and for itself means to speak of a journalism instituted historically and endowed with intentionalities.

When we speak of a “self-image” of newspapers and their journalism, we wish to point out that their voices are not alone, removed from text and context. An analysis like this demands a closer look at their environments, which requires caution. How do we look at a voice that becomes an image, a voice that intends to be unique, defining itself, but that is multifaceted in discourse? How do we look at a resonant voice, which intends to show itself as true and authorized, in the always troubled relationship with the other? In order to approach these issues in a committed way, it is fundamental that we observe how journalism, as an institution, has sought to insert itself into a logic that has historically defined it as “capable”, endowing it with attributes that have attempted to inscribe it as more “true” than the others, thus delimiting a specific image to their place of speech.

**Final considerations: a way to go**

In the short route outlined here, we propose a theoretical-methodological approach so that we can better understand how journalism, as a subject in communication, claims for itself certain capacities that historically have helped it to raise a legitimate aura to the discourses it produces. More than a question about ethics and/or deontological duties of what journalism should be, this
study made some propositions that make it possible to question what journalism, as an institution, has intended to be through its self-legitimating discourses.

From a “self-image”, journalism associates with certain “truths” that are put into play in the arenas of discursive validation. By asking to be recognized it enters the struggle for symbolic legitimation, advocating for itself a particular story to ensure the authority of an institution that is more truthful than others. To speak of a historically limited subject means also to speak of a subject that demands expectations attributed to its competencies. In this way, therefore, it is fundamental that we know how to identify what attributes journalism intends to legitimate from its voices. These attributes insert the newspaper on a course that goes from recognizing (“I can”) to being-recognized, as the defining element of its legitimate capacities, authorized truths to be carried with journalism in becoming.

Only by being aware of these aspects we can analyze newspapers in their journalism, considering their strategies of self-referencing. This premise give us support to historicize a particular course, since we are concerned about understanding how two newspapers, that identify themselves as the most recognized representatives of a said “professional” journalism practiced in the country, are articulating their capacity historically in relation to the vicissitudes of time. This is happening at a time when their “truths” are increasingly put to the test, challenged in the face of an evident crisis of legitimacy of the institution they claim to belong and represent.

This is because there is one kind of journalism that is said, put in institutional discourses, memories of times gone by, and another kind of journalism that is made, inserted daily in the pages of these publications. One must always be attentive to these counterpoints by seeking to historicize truths that are intended to be legitimate at the level of recognition, since not always what is said is, in fact, what is done. We should know, therefore, how to involve the newspapers in their devices, facing them as subjects in communication with their historical potentialities.

*This paper was translated by Patricia Matos*
NOTES

1 We are constructing these assumptions in order to better discuss the process of legitimation of a truth of / in journalism, constructed, more specifically, by two of the most recognized representatives of this model in Brazil, Folha de S. Paulo and O Globo. For the pretensions of this text, of theoretical and methodological character, an empirical analysis of this course will not fit here.

2 It is important to stress that the present article does not necessarily follow the course it outlines. Its ambition, more modest, is just to trace possible interpretations that may help us to face in a more committed way the “truths” that are historically delivered by this institution. For a brief reading on the issue of truth of journalism, see Cornu (1999), Karam (2004) and Gomes (2009).

3 We will not go deeper into this perspective. We just believe that the appropriation of the term “post-truth” by the mainstream traditional newspapers – so-called practitioners of “professional” journalism – is inherent in the very course of a journalism that tries to establish itself more truthfully than others and, therefore, fights an “enemy” to establish its position of recognition and authority. In the specific case of our country, the articulation made by Folha de S. Paulo is paradigmatic, which has been reproducing reports and analyzes on the case with a tone similar to that of American newspapers. For more, see the special issue Ilustríssima, published by Folha: Ilustríssima. Folha de S. Paulo, year 97, issue nº 32.099, 19 February 2017.

4 Still Honneth (2009, p. 199) also addresses the issue of “social esteem” behind these struggles. As a sort of pattern of recognition, such esteem could only be properly conceived “when the existence of a horizon of intersubjectively shared values is introduced as its presupposition.” In this way, the author does not exclude, when analyzing a “shared intersubjectivity”, the experiences and expectations that are not recognized, although his focus is much more connected to the deliberative processes of the communication practices, also an influence of the direct orientation that he had with Habermas. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Honneth’s interpretation (2009) would be more interesting for us if we were to direct our analysis to the mediations and the reception process of these messages of journalism, something that escapes, methodologically, from our pretensions.
4 As a pre-discursive ethos the authors (Benetti and Hagen, 2010, p. 126), in dialogue with Dominique Maingueneau’s ideas (2008), are referring to a “preexisting image” of the one that states: “historically and socially constructed, it is marked by ideology and can be seen as a frame where the subject stands to enunciate and act.” This concept refers to the contract of communication (Charaudeau, 2006), working as a precondition of a discourse that would guarantee the recognition of the identity of that speech.

6 In addition, it is worth noting that, in fact, this article is not focused on discussing the historicization of the modern status of journalism and its process of institutionalization. Identifying this process is, however, a constituent step in the process that we have outlined here. For more, see Albuquerque (2010), Chalaby (1996), Nerone (2012) and Schudson (2010).

7 The notion of the “semiotic subject” originates from analysis by Eric Landowski (1992) on the political nature of the discourses, in which the author believes that we can consider the newspaper as a moral “person”. “Institutionally, it is obvious: the newspaper is a company that, like any other, acts as a collective with legal personality, a statute and a corporate name that guarantees its individuation before the law and before third parties. There’s more, however: the paper has to possess also a brand image, which identifies it on the social communication level. Beyond mere juridical recognition, this implies that a figuratively recognizable entity takes its place behind its title: the newspaper must affirm itself socially as a semiotic subject. [In this way, it is possible to identify that] each newspaper has its style, a tone, a “profile” that defines it and which, through paths which we just outline here, make it a social figure capable of lasting crystallization of attitudes of attraction or repulsion. (Landowski, 1992, p. 118)

REFERENCES


New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


---

**André Bonsanto Dias.** PhD student at the Graduate Program in Communication, University Federal Flumiense (UFF), Niterói-RJ. Has a master's degree in Communication from the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), where he served as a professor in the Department of Social Communication (2012-2013). He was Research Analyst of the National Truth Comission (2014) and editorial assistant at Contracampo - Brazilian journal of Communication (2014-2016). He is holder of a scholarship by Capes. E-mail: andrebonsanto@gmail.com